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CASE COMMENT: CANADA (A-G) V. S.D. MEYERS, 
INC., [2004] 3 F.C.J. NO. 29.
ANGELA COUSINS†
I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 11 of NAFTA grants substantive and procedural rights to inves-
tors of a NAFTA country who invest in another NAFTA jurisdiction. It 
allows citizens of Canada, the US and Mexico, who invest in another 
NAFTA country, the right to obtain damages for government measures 
in violation of the provisions of Chapter 11.1 The provisions of Chapter 
11 have been the subject of both criticism and acclaim. Chapter 11 has 
EHHQKDLOHGDVWKHKHURRIFRPPHUFLDOLQYHVWPHQWHIÀFLHQF\DQGDVD
villain seeking to maximize private business interests at the expense of 
national public interest.
Chapter 11 is aimed at providing stability and reducing uncertain-
ty with respect to decisions on whether to invest in the countries of 
NAFTA.2 Because there is no appellate tribunal designated within Chap-
ter 11, arbitral decisions are subject to judicial review by domestic courts 
only in limited circumstances. However, the standard of review which 
the domestic courts of Canada, the United States and Mexico must ap-
ply to Chapter 11 arbitration cases is uncertain.3  The recent decision of 
the Federal Court in Canada (A.G.) v. S.D. Meyers, Inc.4 is an important 
case because it indicates the standard of review which Canadian courts 
will apply to the decisions of Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals. In addition, 
WKHFDVHLVWKHÀUVWWLPHWKDWD&KDSWHUDUELWUDWLRQDZDUGZDVKHDUG
before the losing party’s own judiciary. 
† Angela Cousins (B.Ed., University of Saskatchewan) is a third-year law student at the 
University of Saskatchewan.  She would like to thank Professor Heavin for her comments on 
this paper.
1 Patricia Isela Hansen, “Judicialization and Globalization in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement” (2003)38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 489 at 497 [Hansen].
2 Joseph A. McKinney, Created From NAFTA (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2000) 
at 224 [McInney].
3 Supra note 1at 498.
4 Canada (A-G) v. S.D. Meyers, Inc., [2004] 3 F.C.J. No. 29 [Meyers]. 
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II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Canada made an application to seek judicial review of arbitration awards 
issued against it pursuant to Chapter 11 of NAFTA.5 The application, 
made by Canada pursuant to Article 34 of the Commercial Arbitration 
Code, sought to have the Federal Court set aside decisions made by the 
Arbitral Tribunal with regard to awards of liability, damages and costs 
to S.D. Myers, Inc (“SDMI”). 6
S.D. Meyers Inc. is a privately-owned Ohio-based toxic waste treat-
ment company which became interested in expanding its operations into 
Canada in the 1990s, as the market for its services began declining in 
the United States. To this end, S.D. Meyers (Canada) Inc. was incorpo-
rated in 1993; the company intended to transport materials which were 
contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from Canada to 
the company’s Ohio site, and dispose of them there.7 
In 1995, the United States Environmental Protection (EPA) issued 
an “enforcement discretion” permitting SDMI to import PCBs subject 
to certain conditions. Canada immediately responded by issuing a tem-
porary ban on PCB waste exports to the United States; this ban remained 
in effect for fourteen months. During this period SDMI was unable to 
import the toxic waste to its Ohio facility.8 
When the border was re-opened, SDMI submitted an arbitration 
claim under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, asserting that the ban violated NAF-
7$VSHFLÀFDOO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRQDWLRQDOWUHDWPHQWDPLQLPXPVWDQGDUG
of treatment, the prohibition on performance requirements, and compen-
sation for expropriation. Pursuant to Article 1116, SDMI asserted that it 
had sustained damages because its investment in Canada had suffered 
harm as a result of the measure taken by Canada.9 The Arbitral Tribunal 
found that Canada had violated its obligations in terms of national treat-
ment and the minimum standard of treatment.10 
The Federal Court found that, according to Article 34 of the Com-
mercial Arbitration Code, judicial review is not provided for, despite 
5 S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award [Meyers, Partial Award].
6 S.D. Meyers, supra note 4 at para. 3.
7 Ibid. at para. 3.
8 Ibid. at paras. 8-9.
9 Ibid. at para. 9.
10 Meyers, Partial Award, supra note 7 at para. 322.
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the fact that the arbitral decision may be based on an error of law or an 
HUURQHRXVÀQGLQJRIIDFW 11 In its decision the Federal Court held that 
because Canada had failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction at the outset 
of the arbitration process, it could not do so after the fact, as this “would 
undermine the clear and express procedures incorporated in NAFTA for 
the resolution of disputes.”12 
However, in the event that it was mistaken in this regard, the Court 
went on to consider the standard of review applicable to the arbitral 
decision. The Federal Court concluded that the application for judicial 
review should be dismissed, holding that the decision of the Tribunal 
ZDV SURSHU LQ ÀQGLQJ WKDW WKH&DQDGLDQ VXEVLGLDU\ RI 6'0,ZDV DQ
investment of SDMI, that SDMI could be protected by Articles 11 and 
12 concurrently, and that SDMI and Canadian providers of toxic waste 
disposal services were in “like circumstances”.13 Finally, the Court held 
that the Tribunal’s awards were not in violation of Canadian public pol-
icy.14 
III. OPPORTUNITY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Article 1136(3)(b) allows for national courts to revise, set aside or an-
nul awards of arbitral tribunals. However, in Meyers, the Federal Court 
recognized that Article 34 of the Commercial Arbitration Code limits 
the Court’s scope for judicial review of a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitra-
tion decision. Referring to the two other Canadian cases addressing the 
issue—The United States v. Metalclad Corp.15 and The United Mexican 
States v. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa16—the Federal Court held that in 
the case at bar the arbitral awards may only be set aside if the Attorney 
General of Canada could prove that: (a) the awards deal with a dispute 
not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to 
arbitration, or (b) the awards contain decisions on matters beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration.17 
11 S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at 42.
12 Ibid. at para. 53.
13 Ibid. at para. 74.
14 Ibid. at para. 56.
15 (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 [Metalclad].
16 [2003] O.J. No. 5070 [Feldman].
17 S.D. Meyers, supra note 4 at para. 44.
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The Court held that because Canada had not raised the issue as to the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal at the outset of the arbitration, it could not 
do so now, as this would undermine the clear and express procedures 
incorporated in NAFTA for the resolution of disputes.18 Thus, the Fed-
eral Court concluded that, according to Article 21(3) of the UNICITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, it lacked a basis on which to judicially review the 
Tribunal’s decision. If the Court were to hold differently, the likelihood 
of parties “shopping around” for different outcomes to arbitration deci-
VLRQVZKLFKZHUHFRXQWHUWRWKHLULQWHUHVWVZRXOGLQFUHDVHVLJQLÀFDQWO\
Of course, this would negatively impact the effectiveness of Chapter 11 
arbitral decisions.
In Myers, Canada attempted to argue that an error of law in the ap-
plication of Articles 1102 and 1105 brought the matter within the scope 
of judicial review. This argument is similar to one made in Metalclad, 
where Mexico submitted that “a patently unreasonable error can amount 
to an excess of jurisdiction.”19 The Court in that case appears to have left 
the issue open, not deciding on the issue as it did not believe there to be 
such an error. The Court did take note, however, that Quinette Coal20 in-
dicated that the domestic test of patently unreasonable error did not ap-
ply to the International Commercial Arbitration Act.21  Here, the Court 
rejected the argument on the basis that Article 34 of the Commercial 
Arbitration Code does not allow errors of law or fact to be grounds for 
judicial review if the decision is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.22 
Nonetheless, the Court went on to consider the appropriate standard of 
review to be applied to the Tribunal’s decision in the event the Court 
ZDVQRWFRUUHFWLQLWVÀQGLQJLQUHVSHFWRIWKHMXULVGLFWLRQPDWWHU
IV. THE FEDERAL COURT’S APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Myers, the Court considered Metalclad, Feldman and Quinette Coal 
and concluded that contrary to Canada’s arguments, the “pragmatic and 
18 Ibid. at 53.
19 Metalclad, supra note 15 at para. 92.
20 Quinette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp., [1990] B.C.J. No. 2241 (BCCA). This case involved 
international arbitration between two private parties.
21  Metalclad, supra note 15 at para 97.
22 S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at para. 42.
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functional” approach to judicial review of domestic administrative tri-
bunals does not apply to international arbitration tribunals.23 A prag-
matic and functional approach cannot be used to create a standard of 
review not provided for in the International Commercial Arbitration 
Act.24 Further, the Court noted that the Supreme Court of Canada has 
stated that review of the correctness of arbitration decisions “ignores 
the fact that the legislature has voluntarily placed limits on such review, 
to preserve the autonomy of the arbitration system.”25 However, later 
in the Myers judgment, the Court refers to Dynamex Canada, Inc. v. 
Momona26 and states: 
in applying the “pragmatic and functional approach” the Federal 
Court held that on questions of law normally considered by the 
Courts, and not on questions that engage the special expertise of 
the tribunal or require the application of the facts to the law, the 
standard is correctness. However, the manner in which the correct 
legal principles are applied to the facts is a question of mixed law 
and fact, and should be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness.27 
[emphasis added]
Thus, the Court concluded that, with regard to the issues that go to the 
“scope of the submission to arbitration”, the standard of review it would 
apply on questions of law is correctness, and the standard on a question 
of mixed law and fact is reasonableness.28  Once the Court considers the 
issues in the event it is mistaken in its assessment of the jurisdictional 
question, the Federal Court appears to apply the pragmatic and func-
tional approach after all.
7KHÀUVWJURXQG&DQDGDUHOLHGRQWRVHWDVLGHWKH7ULEXQDO·VDZDUG
was that the arbitrators had decided issues outside the scope of their au-
WKRULW\7KH&RXUWKHOGWKDWWKHGHÀQLWLRQRI´LQYHVWPHQWRIDQLQYHVWRU
of a Party” was broad enough to conclude that the Tribunal’s interpreta-
23 S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at paras. 38-39. The Court noted that such an approach is not pro-
vided for in Article 34 of the Commercial Arbitration Code.
24 However, in Feldman the Ontario Superior Court seems to suggest it is applying the prag-
matic and functional approach when it applies the factors from Pushpanathan  (Feldman, supra 
note 16 at para. 82) .  
25 S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at para. 40.
26 2003 F.C.A. 248.
27 S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at para. 59.
28 Ibid. at 58.
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WLRQZDV´FRUUHFWµDQGWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHFRUUHFWOHJDOGHÀQLWLRQWR
the facts was “reasonable”.29 The Court rejected Canada’s position that 
SDMI had no “investment” because control of Meyers Canada was not 
based on the legal ownership of shares. It considered that a strict ap-
plication of Canadian domestic law (the Canada Business Corporations 
Act) was too narrow and legalistic as well as contrary to the purposive 
interpretation mandated by Article 2.01 of NAFTA and Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention.30 The Court then found that, though SDMI’s in-
vestment activities could also be characterized as cross-border trade in 
services regulated under Chapter 12, the Tribunal was correct in not pre-
cluding Chapter 11 from applying to SDMI’s rights and obligations.31 
As the issue involving national treatment in “like circumstances” was 
a question of mixed fact and law, the Court agreed that the Tribunal’s 
decision was reasonable.32
The second ground which Canada relied upon was that the award 
YLRODWHVSXEOLFSROLF\7KH)HGHUDO&RXUWGHÀQHVSXEOLFSROLF\LQWKLV
case as relating to “fundamental notions and principles of justice.”33 
The Federal Court held that the Tribunal decision did not in fact violate 
Canadian public policy as it could not be said to be “patently unrea-
VRQDEOHµ´WRWDOO\LUUDWLRQDOµ´WRWDOO\ODFNLQJLQUHDOLW\µRUD´ÁDJUDQW
denial of justice”.34 The facts which the Tribunal found, and the Court 
accepted, did not make for a particularly strong public policy argument 
in this case, and it will be interesting to see how Canadian courts ap-
proach this argument under other circumstances.
As evidenced in this decision, there is little room for judicial review 
of international arbitral awards under Chapter 11. This narrow approach 
is “in keeping with the expectations of the parties, who in the commer-
cial context, have expressly chosen to remove their dispute from the 
jurisdiction of national courts.”35 To this end the Federal Court stated: 
29 Ibid. at para. 66.
30 Ibid. at para. 71.
31 Ibid. at para. 74.
32 Ibid. at para. 55
33 Ibid. at para 56.
34 Noah Rubins, “Judicial Review of Investment Arbitration Awards” (2004) in Todd Weiler, 
ed., NAFTA: Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects, 
(Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2004) 375 [Rubins].
35 S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at para. 39.
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Courts restrain themselves from exercising judicial review with 
respect to international arbitration tribunals so as to be sensitive to 
the need of a system for predictability in the resolution of disputes 
and to preserve the autonomy of the arbitration forum selected by 
the parties.36
,QWKLVFDVHWKH)HGHUDO&RXUWDSSHDUVWRÀUPO\OLPLWWKHSRZHURIGR-
mestic courts to oversee arbitral tribunal decisions. The Ontario Superi-
or Court took a similar position in Feldman. Otherwise, the effect would 
be to transfer to the courts the jurisdiction that is intended, by NAFTA, 
to be vested in the arbitrators.37 Canadian courts seem to agree that def-
erence to arbitral tribunals is necessary to ensure the predictability of 
the enforcement of dispute resolution provisions, and to facilitate freer 
trade on an international scale.38 
IV. CONSISTENCY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The applicable standard of judicial review can still vary depending on 
the circumstances of the case. The standard of review for arbitral deci-
sions is determined by domestic legislation, without any treaty restric-
tion: “[D]ifferent arbitration statutes will cover—or fail to cover—Chap-
ter 11 awards. And different statutes will limit differently the scope of 
review.”39 The United States and Mexico may apply their own domestic 
legislation in determining their domestic courts’ scope of review. Cana-
dian federal law applies if the arbitration takes place in Canada and the 
award is issued by an arbitral tribunal against Canada. If, however, as 
in Metalclad, the arbitration occurs in Canada, but the award is issued 
against another country, then the law of the particular province is ap-
plied.40  
36 Rubins, supra note 35 at 387.
37 S.D. Meyers, supra note 4 at para. 42.
38 Jeffery Atik, “Repenser NAFTA Chapter 11: A Catalogue of  Legitimacy Critiques” (2003) 3 
Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 215 at 225.
39 Jeffery Atik, “Legitimacy, Transparency and NGO Participation in the NAFTA Chapter 11 
Process” in Todd Weiler, ed., NAFTA: Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current 
Practice, Future Prospects, (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2004) 143.
40 Rubins, supra note 35 at 376. 
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In the case of Metalclad, the issue of judicial review was raised in 
the context of which domestic legislation applied. The British Columbia 
Commercial Arbitration Act would allow the courts to re-examine the 
merits of the dispute and set aside an award on the basis of an error of 
law. On the other hand, the British Columbia International Commer-
cial Arbitration Act limited the Court to setting aside the award only in 
cases of serious procedural defects.41 In applying the latter legislation, 
the Court upheld part of the Tribunal’s decision because there was no 
error in arbitral procedure.42 However, the Court found that the Tribunal 
had gone beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration and there-
fore set aside a portion of the Tribunal award.43 Critics of the judgment 
suggested that the Court’s approach intruded into the merits of the case 
and that the decision could lead more states to seek judicial review of 
arbitration decisions.44
The perception that domestic courts cannot be trusted to deal with 
foreign commercial investment claims in an unbiased manner is re-
ÁHFWHGLQPXFKRIWKHDFDGHPLFFRPPHQWDU\,QUHVSRQVHWRFULWLFLVP
directed at Chapter 11, one article states: 
[T]he fundamental reason that the great majority of modern 
investment protection treaties have opted for international 
adjudication is that domestic courts are often in fact, and, just as 
important, usually perceived to be, biased against alien investors, 
especially when those courts must evaluate and pronounce upon 
acts of their own governments.45
The Federal Court’s decision in Meyers, however, should allay the con-
cerns raised by Metalclad. The Court reviewed Canadian jurisprudence 
and made it clear that extensive judicial deference should be granted to 
Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals. In its judgment, the Court emphasized that 
judicial review of arbitration awards negatively affects both the speed 
DQGWKHÀQDOLW\RIWKHDUELWUDWLRQSURFHVV46
41 Metalclad, supra note 15 at para. 91.  
42 Ibid. at para 78.
43 Rubins, supra note 35 at 380.
44 Charles N. Brower and Lee A. Steven, “Who Then Should Judge?:  Developing the Interna-
tional Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 193 at 196 [Brower and 
Steven].
45 S.D. Meyers, supra note 4 at para. 42.
46 Brower and Steven, supra note 45 at 200.
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In addition to their possible bias, domestic courts are regarded as 
less able to understand the complexities of international commercial in-
vestment law, as compared to the experts chosen to constitute an arbitral 
panel.47 Canadian courts, however, appear cognizant of, and responsive 
to, this concern. Canadian courts, in reviewing decisions from both do-
mestic administrative tribunals and Chapter 11 arbitration tribunals, 
have recognized that the expertise of arbitration panels requires courts 
to accord deference to their decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The MeyersGHFLVLRQLVVLJQLÀFDQWLQWKDWWKH)HGHUDO&RXUWDFNQRZO-
edged that it cannot interfere in the decisions of arbitration tribunals 
to import a standard of judicial review which is not contemplated by 
relevant legislation, which in Meyers was the Commercial Arbitration 
Code. The Court appeared to recognize that if it were to do so, the result 
ZRXOGEHWRGLPLQLVKWKHHIÀFLHQF\DQGÀQDOLW\LQWHQGHGWREHLPEXHG
in the Chapter 11 arbitration tribunal process. If Canadian courts fol-
low the reasoning of the Federal Court, the result should be that “if the 
Tribunal has jurisdiction, the correct procedures are followed and the 
correct formalities are observed, the award—good, bad or indifferent 
²LVÀQDODQGELQGLQJRQWKHSDUWLHVµ48 However, the Court’s perspec-
tive as to the “pragmatic and practical” approach to the judicial standard 
of review is not as clear as it could be. It will be interesting to see how 
&DQDGLDQFRXUWVGHÀQHDQGDSSO\WKHVWDQGDUGRIUHYLHZWR&KDSWHU
tribunals in future cases.
47 S.D. Meyers, supra note 4 at para. 42.
